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Background
This test was conducted as part of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Independent Testing project. This project was established to help reduce the barriers of wind energy expansion by providing independent testing results for small turbines. Several turbines were selected for testing at the National Wind Technology Center (NWTC) as a part of the Small Wind Turbine Independent Testing project. Safety and function testing is one of up to five tests that may be performed on the turbines. Other tests include power performance, duration, acoustic noise, and power quality.
The test equipment included a SWIFT wind turbine manufactured by Renewable Devices mounted on a 13.7-meter free-standing monopole tied to the grid through a Kaco Blueplanet 1502x inverter. The turbine was provided by Cascade Engineering of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Cascade Engineering is the North American distributor of the SWIFT turbine and a DOE grant recipient. The system was installed by the NWTC Site Operations group with guidance and assistance from Cascade Engineering.
Test Objective
The objectives of this test were to:
• Verify whether the test turbine displays the behavior predicted in the design • Determine whether provisions relating to personnel safety are properly implemented • Characterize the dynamic behavior of the wind turbine at rated and higher wind speeds.
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) does not limit safety and function tests to features described in the wind turbine documentation. NREL also inspects-possibly tests-and reports on features that are required by IEC 61400-2 that may not be described in the wind turbine documentation. NREL conducted this test in accordance with Section 9.6 of the IEC standard, "Wind Turbines-Part 2: Design Requirements for Small Wind Turbines," IEC61400-2, second edition, 2006-03.
Description of Test Turbine and Setup
The test turbine was a grid-connected SWIFT wind turbine. The SWIFT is an upwind, 5-bladed with outer ring, side furling turbine with a rated power of 1 kW. Figure 1 shows the test turbine installed at the National Wind Technology Center. Table 1 provides the key descriptive information of the test turbine. The test turbine was located at site 3.1 at the NWTC, which is approximately 8 km south of Boulder, Colorado. The terrain consists of mostly flat terrain with short vegetation. The site has prevailing winds bearing approximately 292 degrees relative to true north. Figure 2 shows the general electrical arrangement. The wire run from the nacelle at the top of the tower to the point of grid connection at the data shed was approximately 46 meters. The connection was made using #12 American Wire Gauge (AWG) wire for the two power lines and turbine signal, and #6 AWG for ground. The data shed housed the inverter, power instrumentation, disconnect switch, and data acquisition system. The 240 VAC power output from the turbine was connected to a series of insulating step-up transformers that raised the voltage to 13.2 kilovolts, allowing the system to tie to the NWTC grid. 
Instrumentation
The following parameters were measured in this test: wind speed, electrical power, rotor speed, turbine status, and grid voltage. An indication of turbine status was obtained by measuring the dynamic brake voltage from the turbine controller. The rotor speed was measured using a frequency-to-voltage converter mounted to the side of the turbine that transmitted its output wirelessly to the data acquisition system. The instruments used for these measurements are listed in Table 2 . The calibration sheets for the instruments used for this safety and function test are included in Appendix A. The DAS modules, power transducer, and primary wind speed anemometer were used beyond the calibration due dates. The initial power measuring module failed its post-test calibration. An investigation was performed on the data acquired but there were no indications that the module failed during the test. It was concluded that it may have been damaged during shipping. This was listed as an exception to our QA system.
Procedure
Safety and function testing can involve some risk to personnel and to equipment. By incorporating appropriate controls into testing procedures, NREL endeavored to accomplish its tasks with minimal risk. This test report documents these controls in areas where they might have influenced the results obtained.
Control and Protection System Functions
In the list below, turbine response was observed for each major response category (startup, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown). If faults or other actions caused one of these major responses to occurred, NREL simulated the appropriate input and verified that the control and protection system sensed the condition, and provided indication of an appropriate response. This procedure enabled, for example, all the E-stop functions to be checked without exposing the turbine to multiple, potentially-damaging stops. These checks were designated by the term "behavior" in the list below. 
Personnel Safety Provisions
The second part of the test procedure was to evaluate provisions for personnel safety. For this turbine, the following issues were reviewed. 
Results
The results reported here were based on testing conducted from 1 November 2010, when the turbine was commissioned, through 31 March 2012. The turbine controller settings were tested in January 2012. The turbine was decommissioned on 27 June 2012.
Control and Protection System Functions
The turbine exhibited no unexpected or inherently unsafe behavior during this investigation; however, this did not mean that the turbine is safe under all conditions. NREL limited testing to investigation of single-fault failures and did not investigate failures of "safe life" components. If a second fault were to occur during a critical event, severe results can be expected. Neither NREL nor the IEC turbine-design requirements make judgments on whether such failures are likely or whether additional features in the control and protection system are needed to protect against such consequences. Figure 3 shows that the power output of the turbine system was limited in response to high winds. The power curve scatter plot is characteristic of a stall regulated wind turbine, as expected. The turbine had a furling system that limited the amount of power it produced because it began to govern its rotor speed at 10 m/s. Also, in Figure 3 the power curve shows a maximum 1.8-kilowatt instantaneous power. The limit was achieved by the controller applying its dynamic brake if the rotor speed exceeded its safe operating level of 480 revolutions per minute (RPMs). Figure 4 illustrates a time series of the turbine power control behavior during a highwind event.
Power Control
Rotor Speed Control
Rotor speed measurements were taken in January 2012. Figure 5 illustrates how the rotor speed was regulated by the furling system starting at around 10 m/s. The Figure 5 scatter plot also contains the wind speed bin average, 1-minute average, and 1-second maximum and minimum rotor speeds. The rotor average speed always stayed below its operating range maximum of 450 RPMs. The dynamic brake was automatically applied if the rotor speed exceeded the instantaneous safe operating level of 480 RPMs. On 5 January 2012 a high RPM event was recorded, as seen in Figure 5 . As noted in the log book: "The rotor reached a maximum of 489 RPM then immediately applied the break, reducing the rotor speed back to 80 RPMs in 5 seconds." Figure 4 illustrates a time series of the turbine behavior and how the rotor speed was regulated during a high-wind event. When the turbine was turned off, or experienced a fault or a grid outage, the rotor speed reduced to an idling speed less than 16 RPMs. The idling speed was verified to stay below 16 RPMs even at high-wind speed as seen in Figure 6 . Extra precaution needed to be taken when approaching the rotor because it did not stop.
Yaw Orientation
The SWIFT was an upwind, passive yaw turbine with two tail fins. The unit was equipped with a furling mechanism that engaged during high winds, causing the turbine to turn the rotor perpendicular to the wind. NREL observed this yaw behavior frequently during the test period and compared yaw position with the nearby wind vane's indication of wind direction. Normal yawing behavior was observed under all wind conditions. Winds greater than 2.5 m/s were necessary to begin to orient the turbine to the correct wind direction. The turbine had a dynamic response; during some high winds the rotor was observed to yaw approximately 60 degrees in one second due to its furling mechanism. Extra precaution needs to be taken by personnel when approaching the rotor because the turbine is not equipped with a yaw lock.
This turbine used slip-rings to transmit power to and from the nacelle to the tower cable. Therefore, droop cable over-twist was not an issue.
Startup
NREL observed that the turbine rotor started spinning whenever winds increased above 2 m/s. The inverter was programed to allow the turbine to couple with the grid when it reached 150 V Page 12 of 46 (about 170 RPMs). This coupling rotor speed could be achieved at winds averaging 5 m/s. Figure 7 shows the rotor speed versus power production. Figure 8 illustrates a time series of the turbine behavior as the wind increased above cut-in. NREL did not observe any abnormal behavior during any of the startups. NREL observed similar smooth cut-in transitions when the turbine was returned to service after shutdown or a fault had been cleared.
Normal Shutdown
When winds dropped below cut-in, the turbine stopped producing power with no significant change in sound or behavior. The turbine allowed the rotor to freewheel in wind speeds less than cut-in. Figure 9 illustrates a time series of the turbine behavior as the wind decreased below the power production threshold.
This turbine did not have a cut-out wind speed, thus it did not normally shut down in high winds.
Emergency Shutdown from Any Operating Condition During Operation
The turbine was not equipped with a dedicated emergency stop button. The AC or DC disconnect rotary switches were used to turn off the turbine in case of an emergency (see Figure 10 and Figure 11 ). Turning any of the rotary switches to the off position immediately disconnected the turbine from the grid and applied the dynamic break by shorting the generator, decreasing the rotor speed to less than 16 RPM in about 9 seconds under any wind conditions. This behavior was consistent with the manual's statement that the system could be shut down at any wind speed. The turbine behavior during the activation of the AC isolation switch can be seen in Figure 6 during the mimic outage performed by NREL. Once the isolator was turned to the off position, the voltage immediately dropped to zero. The grid voltage monitoring also provided another source of turbine availability. The primary source of the availability was based on a controller voltage signal. The signal triggered the dynamic break relay that shorted the generator. Figure 12 illustrates the turbine behavior during the activation of the DC isolation switch. The dynamic break signal had a high reading (5 V) in the DC isolation exercise because the DC isolation switch was hooked up directly to the turbine as seen in Figure 2 .
Behavior Upon Excessive Vibration
A high-wind event and variable wind direction was observed on 16 December 2010 that caused excessive vibration, forcing the turbine to lock down. The turbine immediately disconnected from the grid and applied its dynamic break bringing the rotor to a safe idling speed. The turbine had to be manually reset in order to fully return to a normal operational state, indicating it had locked out for excessive vibration as stated in the owner's manual. The turbine controller did not show any indication when the turbine locked down. The owner's manual instructed the user to observe if there was no change in rotor speed at power-producing wind speeds, thus indicating a lock up. Subsequently, the user was instructed to perform a turbine reset in order to bring the turbine back to normal operation.
Behavior Upon Loss of Load
In the event of a grid outage or large fluctuations, the SWIFT immediately disconnected from the grid in order to prevent any electric hazards. The controller shorted the generator, reducing the
